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Abstract 
Behavioral strategy completes the analyses of superior profitability by highlighting how non-
economic but behavioral barriers generate an alternative source of strategic opportunities. 
Existing internal and external analysis frameworks fail to explain why strategic factors can be 
systematically mispriced and why large firms’ structural and resource advantage are regularly 
disrupted by entrepreneurs. We argue that the systematic biases documented in the behavioral 
and organizational sciences in fact illuminate an alternative source of competitive advantage. 
Strategists could develop superior insights into the value of resources and recognize factors 
that are either under or over-valued while competitors remain blind to such possibilities. Our 
argument is illustrated by how three “underdogs” disrupted the incumbents in their industries 
by exploiting rivals’ predictable biases and blind spots. We conclude by discussing how our 
ideas can be generalized as an alternative, behavioral approach for strategy.  
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A fundamental question in Strategy is the determinants of superior profitability. How 
do we explain why some firms are more profitable than others? Two theoretical frameworks 
that address this question have been dominant in the past several decades: Porter’s external 
analysis framework (i.e., Five Forces Framework) and the internal analysis framework (i.e., 
the Resource Based View of the Firm). In a nutshell, while the Porter framework emphasizes 
structural advantage (Porter, 1980; Puranam & Vanneste, 2016) in the product market as the 
key source of superior profitability, the internal framework shifts attention to the strategic 
factor market and to the control of VRIN (valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable) 
resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  
 Despite the widespread acceptance and adoption of these two theoretical frameworks 
in both teaching and research, two puzzles remain regarding these determinants of superior 
profits. First, if the relationship between having superior profit and acquiring certain VRIN 
resources or structural advantages is well known, the cost of acquiring these factors should 
reflect their value (Barney, 1986). This in turn implies competitive parity – failing to acquire 
these factors mean disadvantage but controlling them is not sufficient for generating abnormal 
return, because these factors could not have been acquired by foresight or design. To explain 
superior profit, we need a theory for why strategic factors are systematically mispriced in the 
first place, in the absence of random causes such as luck, serendipity or preadaptation (Barney, 
1986; Cattani, 2005; Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003).  
 The second puzzle arises from the empirical observation that large firms are regularly 
disrupted. Conventional strategy frameworks usually do not do a good job explaining: (a) why 
these large firms’ structural advantage and VRIN resources suddenly ceased to generate profit; 
and (b) how entrepreneurs who had neither structural advantage nor VRIN resources (who 
should not have entered in the first place according to conventional strategy frameworks) could 
disrupt their heavyweight competitors.  
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 We propose an alternative source of superior profit that complements existing strategy 
frameworks: superior profit can result from having superior behavioral insights into the 
cognitive biases of one’s competitors. Conventional strategy frameworks are mostly imported 
from economics where actors are assumed to be rational. But decades of research in behavioral 
and cognitive sciences have shown that people can sometimes be predictably irrational (Ariely, 
2008; Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Thaler, 2015). We argue that these 
systematic biases in fact illuminate an alternative source of competitive advantage because they 
can imply predictable false expectations (Harrison & March, 1984), mispricing of important 
strategic factors (Zuckerman, 2012) or suboptimal responses to competitions and changes 
(Christensen, 1997). In this sense, strategists could develop superior insights into the value of 
resources and recognize factors that are either under or over-valued while competitors remain 
blind to such possibilities. Our account may also explain how some less resourceful strategists 
could nevertheless disrupt strong incumbents by exploiting their superior insights into the value 
of resources and strategic factors.  
An analogy to our approach is how Michael Porter developed his famous Five Force 
framework. While most ideas in his 1980 book were well known in industrial economics, he 
turned those ideas on their head and advised firms to utilize this knowledge to gain monopoly. 
Similarly, our proposal is to turn the well-known suboptimal cognitive biases on their head as 
a way to gain superior insight and subsequently superior profits. For example, resources can 
be under- or over-valued due to biases such as homophily or overconfidence (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) which may not be corrected for due 
to learning myopia or inertia to prior successes (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Levinthal & 
March, 1993). This is bad news to incumbents because they are likely to get stuck in local 
optimum. But this is good news to informed strategists who can then maneuver to gain an upper 
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hand based on their superior cognitive and behavioral understanding of the competitive 
landscape. 
To illustrate this approach, we present three case studies: the cases of Moneyball in 
Major League Baseball (MLB, Lewis, 2003), Capital One in credit card financing (Chang, 
2005) and DFJ, a venture capital firm in Silicon Valley (Liu, Vlaev, Fang, Denrell, & Chater, 
2017). In each one of these three cases, an “underdog” (i.e., a least resourceful MLB team, a 
naïve entrepreneur or a peripheral venture capitalist) disrupted the incumbents in their industry 
by exploiting the cognitive and behavioral insights they gained. They then grew and thrived 
with little resistance thanks to incumbents’ blind spots and inertia. Even though in some cases 
the competitive advantage may not have lasted, the fact that these underdogs were able to 
outcompete the venerable incumbents at all was remarkable. After a detailed discussion of 
these three illustrations, we conclude by discussing how our ideas can be generalized as an 
alternative, behavioral approach for strategy. 
 
The Case of Moneyball: A Tale of (not) Judging Talents by the Look 
 Acquiring talents is one of the most important tasks in business. This is even more so 
in the top three professional sports in the United States, where players are direct inputs to a 
team’s professional success both in the competitive arena as well as in advertising. These 
professional sports also generate substantial business activities - average team values are 1.4 
billion USD in National Basketball Association (NBA), 1.5 billion USD in Major League 
Baseball (MLB) and 2.4 billion USD in National Football League (NFL), according to Forbes. 
The story of the Oakland Athletes (the A's), a team in the American League West of MLB, 
illustrates how a team with little resources can nevertheless develops superior insights into the 
value of its resources (i.e., players) and exploit this gap in knowledge to outsmart its much 
richer rivals.  
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 Despite being one of the poorest teams in MLB (e.g., one third of the payroll compared 
to the New York Yankees), the A’s managed to earn the highest winning percentages during 
1999-2003. Its number of wins in the American League West for most of the years from 1999 
to the present is within the top two. How can a team so poor win so many games? According 
to the bestseller Moneyball (Lewis, 2003), Billy Beane, the General Manager of the As, 
exploited a widely shared, stereotype bias in MLB. Many team managers and scouts in MLB 
believed that superior talents should have a certain “look”. If a candidate player looks more 
similar to such a stereotype, he is more likely to be considered more talented and hirable.  
 To be fair, since there is a positive (though imperfect) correlation between the look and 
future performances, this stereotype belief is a useful heuristic for scouts to shortlist superior 
talents among thousands of candidates. The problem arises when many scouts adopted the same 
approach. An imperfect correlation implies two possible errors (Gilovich, 2008): a false 
positive one (i.e., some players who have the look are overrated) and a false negative error (i.e., 
some players who do not have the look are underestimated). In MLB, the false positive error 
can be fixed – overrated players may be hired, and then terminated once their deficiency is 
discovered. In fact, this is the career history of Billy Beane – while he looked the part in high 
school, he floundered in MLB and his career as a player was short lived.  
 The second, false negative error, is potentially more persistent as it is not visible: 
undervalued players are not hired so teams rarely have the opportunities to follow a player who 
succeed despite not fitting the stereotype. Because teams do not see these players they are 
unable to truly evaluate the effectiveness of the stereotype heuristics. Moreover, the diffusion 
of this heuristic creates an endogenous sampling bias: most MLB players now share the look 
because they make the cut based on their looks in the first place. This further reduces the 
samples available to falsify the stereotype heuristic. Instead, team end up placing false 
confidence on the robustness of this hiring approach because the validity of hiring based on 
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stereotype is seemingly supported multiple times – a confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). 
Furthermore, many scouts were retired players whose career benefited from having the look. 
This created strong identity and normative pressures against experimenting alternative hiring 
approaches. The implication is that a once partially useful stereotype heuristic now becomes a 
bias in MLB.    
 Once this bias is apparent ex post, a clear strategy would be to hire against the 
stereotype. More specifically, one could gain advantage by hiring players who contribute more 
to team winnings than their look (and salary) implies and firing those who contribute less than 
their look implies. This is what Billy Beane did in the A’s – he hired statisticians to help identify 
these mis-valued players by formally analyzing data that were previously ignored.   
 But applying a statistical approach is insufficient to explain the success of the A’s. Such 
an approach, called Sabermetrics by MLB fans, existed long before Billy Beane adopted it and 
the 2003 publication of Moneyball. Moreover, there is no barrier in adopting this statistical 
approach – baseball data is publicly available and talents in statistical analysis are abundant. 
Why did other teams fail to adopt the A’s approach before and even after 2003, when the 
stereotype heuristic was proven flawed?  
 In other words, why did Billy Beane succeed in exploiting his superior understanding 
of the value of his players while others could not? First, hiring against the stereotype and norms 
is risky. Yet Billy Beane was himself a player with a failed career and this personal experience 
makes him very credible in convincing the stakeholders to adopt an alternative approach to 
hiring.  Second, the A’s is one of the poorest teams in MLB. This means that they had to try a 
different approach to win – following the conventional approach promises low performances 
due to lack of resources. Coupled with low resource is low expectations – owners, fans and 
other stakeholder can tolerate more experimentation as they have little to lose anyway. For a 
much richer team such as the New York Yankees, the incentives to innovate is much less as 
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they could afford to buy their way out. At the same time, expectations to win are sky high 
which further reduces the motivation to experiment.  
 To conclude, Billy Beane took advantage of the stereotype bias and exploited the 
mispricing of specific players as identified by data analytics. This strategic opportunity, 
apparent ex post, was largely ignored by competitors because they are either unable to see the 
false negatives in their hiring (Gilovich, 2008) or trapped in the “iron cage” due to their 
identities, norms and inertia (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
 
The Case of Capital One: A Tale of Falsifying Conventional Wisdom 
 Credit card financing before 1980 was once dominated by large banks, such as Citi, 
Bank of America and Chase. Banks issued cards to existing customers with proven track 
records and once these “low hanging fruit” were exploited, they expanded the business by 
soliciting new customers through direct mailing campaigns, and profits grew steadily. The 
creditworthiness of new applicants was computed based on data on debt-income ratio and 
credit scores. Applicants whose ratios/scores are above banks’ cutoff point were offered credit 
cards with unified APR (Annual Percentage Rate) and annual fee.  
 Richard Fairbank, the founder of Capital One, was puzzled by this business model in 
credit cards financing when he studied for his MBA at Stanford in the early 80s: “the fact that 
everyone had the same price (same APR and annual fee) for credit cards in a risk-based 
business was strange”. He realized that higher risk customers were subsidized by lower risk 
ones. Moreover, potentially profitable customers (e.g., with poor but now improved scores or 
young applicants with no credit history) were likely overlooked because it was almost 
impossible for them to get an approval from any bank. This observation inspired Fairbank to 
develop a simple proposal: “mass customization”, i.e., each credit card customer should be 
charged with different APR and annual fees depending on his or her actual risk profile. 
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Fairbank also believed that information technologies could facilitate the implementation of this 
proposal by systematically collecting and analysing the large volume of customer data.      
 Fairbank identified a status quo bias of the incumbent banks. Banks developed a routine 
to select customers who are more likely to repay their loan. It worked reasonably well so there 
was little motivation for the incumbents to try alternative approaches. More importantly, 
introducing varying APR and annual fees not only means dramatic changes in incumbent’s 
existing IT systems and decision structure, but it could also attract complains from existing 
customers who could have received a less favourable rate. Competitors could also respond by 
stealing these unhappy customers by offering the original status quo. Fairbank received 
universally negative feedback when he pitched his proposal to the large banks, with comments 
such as “this is not the way we do things here”, “interesting but this means we have to reinvent 
the system to implement your proposal”, or simply “this is too risky”.  
 Disapprovals from the incumbents’ were a blessing for Fairbank in hindsight. He 
realised that “when the world changes, often the last people to know are the ones that are most 
deeply involved in the old way”. This is the incumbent bias that he later set out to exploit with 
a threefold strategy. First, he negotiated a deal with Signet, a mid-size, regional bank. Fairbank 
was paid purely by the profit generated through new credit card customers solicited by 
Fairbank’s approach. In exchange Fairbank gained full control of the credit card business 
division. This proposal is mutually beneficial – Signet had little to lose and Fairbank had an 
independent set up that is essential for implementing his innovative idea. 
 Second, Fairbank only hired people from outside the banking industry to design and 
test the right approach of mass customization. Experienced employees from the banking 
industry can be useful in the short run but they would likely have internalized all conventional 
wisdom – decision heuristics that are useful in stable environment. As such, experience in the 
banking industry was seen as biased. Instead, hiring was mainly targeted at those who were 
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outsiders, naïve and free from the possible constraints of conventional wisdom and norms, 
harnessing “the power of an objective ignorant view of the world from someone who really 
didn’t know anything about credit card business”.  
 Third, Fairbank believed in experimentations. For instance, Capital One tested 
interviewing loan applicants as an evaluation process. They accepted those applicants with the 
highest interview scores as well as the bottom ones by design in an experiment. Capital One 
found no statistical difference in the loan repayment record between the two groups in the next 
three years, thereby proving that interviews were neither necessary nor informative. To search 
for a winning combination of loan offers, Capital One ran varying deals with direct marketing. 
After two years of numerous tests and failures, Fairbank finally found an attractive 
combination: a 9.9% APR (half of industry standard) with a hassle-free balance transfer. This 
proved to be a success after introduced nation-wide and the business expanded with customized 
deals routinely introduced.    
 As another illustration, consider customers who asked to leave with an outsider offer. 
These customers would be randomly assigned with one of the three responses: (a) decline by 
calling it a bluff; (b) make the same counteroffer; (c) meet the customer half way. Then Capital 
One would build a regression model to predict how different customer profiles predict the 
lowest offer that will make them stay with Capital One. This analysis can then enable a strong 
decision support system – staff on the phone will have an immediate recommendation for a 
particular calling in – for this specific customer the system will show, for example, an 
empirically verified response such as “negotiate down to 17.5%”. This is just one of the 7,000 
experiments Capital One did in 1997.  
 Importantly, Fairbank established a culture that the firm is run like a scientific lab - 
employees are rewarded when their ideas worked as evidenced by tests rather than by their 
experience or seniority. Incumbents may be able to imitate Fairbank’s specific scheme (e.g., a 
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low introductory rate with balance transfer), but they may find it hard to catch up with the 
continuous innovations by Capital One that is fuelled by its culture of testing and falsifying 
conventional wisdom systematically.    
 To conclude, incumbent in credit card business in the 80s suffered from two important 
biases that Fairbank managed to exploit. First is a status quo bias – incumbents’ under-explored 
(March, 1991) because they were too satisfied with their business model but they in fact got 
stuck in a local optimum (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Second is incumbents’ dilemma – even 
if some banks recognized the necessity of change, their prior successes, existing systems and 
culture held them back: large banks like Citi and Chase failed to respond to the challenges from 
Capital One and did nothing for almost two years. The inertia from these “Goliaths” was 
sufficient for Capital One to grow from nowhere and disrupted successfully the venerable 
credit card industry.  
  
The Case of DFJ: A Tale of Searching for Homerun Startups by Becoming A Magnet 
 The goal of venture capitalists is clear – finding a homerun startup that many other 
competitors overlook or do not have access to invest. This is like searching for a needle in a 
haystack – tens of thousands of startups are established every year and it is almost impossible 
to identify who will become the next big thing ex ante. Even when some of them are obviously 
promising, they may attract multiple biddings from competitors so the venture capitalist’s 
expected profit would be diluted.  
 Some successful venture capitalists overcome this challenge by becoming the “brokers” 
in social networks by recombining information from their own multiple social and professional 
cliques that otherwise would not have been in contact. This increases the odds of finding higher 
quality startups or even homeruns in two ways. First, because the ideas they approach are 
typically from their own elite networks, the average quality is higher than otherwise. Second, 
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competition is reduced because the network connections make the interactions a repeated 
game. This is how the first generation of venture capitalist became successful in Silicon Valley.   
 However, this posed a challenge to latecomers such as Draper Fisher Jurvetson (DFJ), 
a US venture capital firm. DFJ realized from the beginning that they had to adopt a different 
approach otherwise they had no chance of beating the incumbents, i.e., the elite network 
brokers. DFJ identified a weakness of the elite network approach, i.e., the homophily bias. 
While this approach has been proven successful, the ideas they have access to tend to be 
homogeneous and uniform as the cliques they connect tend to be similar to them and think 
alike. This implies that the elite venture capitalists may systematically underestimate atypical 
ideas or those developed by people outside the elite networks. This behavioral insight was then 
translated into three specific strategies to compete against the network brokers.  
 First, DFJ only focused on emerging field that was too risky for the incumbents to 
engage. For example, when the nanotechnology emerged in early 2000, DFJ publicized 
themselves as a leading investor in this field and promised to evaluate every proposal submitted 
to them. Note that this approach is the opposite to the conventional, secretive approach of most 
other venture capitalists. DFJ overcomes the homophily bias by opening up, attracting a large 
volume of business proposals from the widest possible range of sources, including those out of 
reach by even the most connected network brokers. As DFJ put it: “We want to become a 
powerful magnet so the needles find us”. 
 Second, DFJ learned from a large volume of proposals, believing that a technological 
breakthrough is more likely to happen in an area where many people are working on the same 
thing. While hiring many qualified evaluators to go through each business proposal submitted 
is costly, this enhances the likelihood that DFJ identifies the next big trend, and the eventual 
winning start-up in the trend.  
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 Third and finally, after selecting proposal based on the identified trend, DFJ still needs 
to ensure the final stage of selection is free from the homophily bias and consistent with their 
goal, i.e., scoring on the most extreme ideas that promise a homerun startup. To achieve this, 
DFJ set a default rule: they invest in a start-up as long as at least one partner feels very strongly 
about the idea, and avoids unanimity in investment decisions. Because it is very costly to 
implement the “magnet strategy” and the “learning from large volume strategy”, DFJ has to 
make sure they invest in the most radical ideas with potentially exceptional returns to justify 
the additional investment. By definition, radical ideas are against conventional wisdom and are 
likely to be discounted. If all partners agree on the potential of an idea, this idea is perhaps not 
radical enough. Moreover, competition will be more intense when commercializing such idea 
because other venture capitalists may see it coming too. DFJ instead believes that “the basis 
for investment decisions is not compromise but strong beliefs by individual partners”. 
 To conclude, incumbents in Silly Valley when DFJ was established suffer from several 
potential biases, notable, the homophily bias. To beat the incumbent venture capitalists, DFJ 
turned the homophily bias on its head and developed a set of coherent strategies to exploit 
incumbent’s blind spot. When others act as brokers and link elites from different cliques to 
enhance the average quality of business proposals, DFJ acts as a magnet to attract large volume 
of ideas to generate the maximum variance. When others operate secretly to protect their 
connections and insights, DFJ opens up and learns the next big trend using the wisdom of the 
crowd. When others make investment decisions based on consensus, DFJ agrees on the basis 
of disagreement. The case of DFJ shows how cognitive biases can become useful guide for 
turning own weakness into strength and competitors’ strength into weakness. 
   
Conclusion 
 13 
 Decades of research in behavioral sciences shows that people do not always behave 
rationally (Bazerman & Moore, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; March & Heath, 1994). Less explored 
is how to overcome these biases to gain competitive advantage and increase performance. We 
presented three cases to show how the behavioral insights and superior understanding of the 
competitive landscape can lead to superior profitability. While behavioral theories are often 
descriptive, we believe that they can in fact be normatively useful - strategists could benefit 
from decades of behavioral literature on socio-cognitive biases and develop superior 
understanding of competitive asymmetry – i.e., when competitors are systematically biased. In 
other words, our approach turns behavioral theories on their head: we use the generative 
mechanisms of existing behavioral theories to generate an alternative source of opportunities 
and superior profit.  
 Our cases suggest further that identifying cognitive biases is not sufficient for gaining 
advantage unless a strategist could also develop a second order behavioral insight (Keynes, 
1936) – why others are more biased than the strategist. More generally, to profit from a 
behavioral opportunity, an asymmetry between a strategist and the rest is necessary (Benner & 
Zenger, 2016; Massey & Thaler, 2013; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997): the strategist has to stumble 
less on biases such as learning myopia, incumbents’ dilemma or inertia compared to others. 
Otherwise behavioral opportunities may exist but imply competitive parity (i.e., many can 
identify the inefficiencies and exploit them) or the opportunities may be left unexploited (i.e., 
opportunities are identified but no one is insensitive enough to act against inertia and other 
social constraints). In other words, a strategist needs to have not only a behavioral theory of 
others (i.e., predicting when others make mistakes) but also a behavioral theory of asymmetries 
(i.e., predicting when the biases and constraints apply only to others).  
 Our theory has important implications for existing strategy theories. Conventional 
strategic frameworks suggest that superior profitability can be a result of having strong entry 
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barriers, superior positioning or VRIN resources and capabilities. Yet theoretically we still do 
not have a clear explanation for why their prices failed to reflect their value in the first place, 
and why many firm in possession of these assets still fail. This suggests that conventional 
theories are incomplete when explaining the source of superior profitability. Our approach 
proposes that behavioral barriers are important sources for explaining performance differences. 
Due to cognitive biases, important strategic factors can be systematically mispriced and such 
inefficiencies can persist leading to sustained superior profitability for the informed.  
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